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Abstract 
This paper attempts not only to interpret the political theory of Hannah Arendt but also 
to develop it from the author's viewpoint. According to the author, Hannah Arendt's concept 
of action and the active participation of ordinary people in politics can provide a theoretical 
basis for a theory of humane politics that focuses on influencing the macro-level of politics 
through voluntary, nonviolent action at the micro-level, that is, from the grass-roots level 
of actively engaged citizens. The paper clarifies that the purpose of Arendt's political theory 
was to restore the perspective of ordinary citizens and the meaning of politics as the 
participation of ordinary citizens in public afairs. Furthermore, the paper shows how citizen 
participation in politics encourages individual initiative, open-mindedness, creative problem-
solving, and a sharing of ideas that can benefit al concerned. 
1. Introduction 
Hannah Arendt was one of the 20th century's greatest political thinkers. She was, by 
her own account, a professional political theorist1) whose theorizing about politics was a 
continual dialogue with the great political thinkers of the Western tradition. But her 
reflections on politics were more than just a reflection on a "great man" tradition of the past 
- Arendt always believed that political theory had to encompass an appreciation for the 
experiences of ordinary people and ordinary political actors, and the universal experiences 
of mankind. No elitist, Arendt held that ordinary people's perspectives on the political world 
were of crucial importance for understanding the true nature of political action. 
Politics was for Arendt above al a human activity that must be understood from the 
standpoint of the human beings who are part of politics. Her understanding of politics 
differs from most modern views insofar as she believed that politics at bottom had to be 
* Professor of Political Philosophy, Kansai University. 
This paper was presented at the 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) 
that was held from July 9th to 13th 2006 in Fukuoka, Japan. 
1) On October 28, 1964, in the conversation with Gtinter Gaus, a well-known journalist at the time, Hannah 
Arendt said, "My profession, if one can even speak of it at al, is political theory."(Hannah Arendt,'"What 
remains? The Language Remains': A Conversation with Gtinter Gaus," in Hannah Arendt, Essays in Under-
standing 1930-1954, edited by Jerome Kohn, New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994, p. 1.) 
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understood as the micro-level of the participating citizenry rather than from the macro-level 
perspective of nation-states and the . elites who govern them. Much of modem political 
theorizing is state-centered. In the great・political thinkers of the modem era including 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, the focus is on the need for a powerful 
authority to preserve the peace, and this authority is concentrated at the state level to insure 
the safety and security of the people. Politics in this view is al about nations, states and 
the decisions that are made at the national level and on the international stage of power 
politics. 
But this kind of perspective misses the crucially important dimension of the everyday 
"life-world" .-in German·Lebenswelt —of ordinary people and citizens. Making the 
situation even worse is the fact that liberalism had become the dominant ideology in the 
Western world and according to its tenets the entire economic arena was to be relegated to 
a private realm excluded from the purview of politics. Politics thus became even more 
detached from the actual life-world of ordinary people and citizens, for whom the economic 
arena of labor and production is so important. 
The purpose of Arendt's political theory was to restore the perspective of ordinary 
citizens and the meaning of politics as the participation of ordinary citizens in public affairs. 
The macro-level of state action, she believed, always needed to be viewed from the micro-
level of citizen action. But Arendt could view her work, which in many ways appeared quite 
radical, as a restoration rather than a new innovation because the perspective on politics 
that she sought to reestablish was one highly developed by the ancient Greeks for whom 
political life was the chief aspect of life. She could also draw upon a few modem thinkers 
like Tocqueville, who saw politics as a process created by self-governing citizens. In most 
of modem politics, Arendt believed, something had been lost, and this could be restored, 
she held, by a focus on people's actual lived experiences and by an ongoing dialogue with 
thinkers of the past who had not lost an understanding for the crucial dimension of citizen 
participation and citizen action. As Margaret Canovan has pointed out, it is the characteristic 
of Arendt's political theory "to articulate experience in this way, to enable people to think 
consciously what they have been only half aware of, to give them names by which to 
remember experiences that would otherwise vanish without trace."2) 
From the popular nonviolent uprisings in Eastern Europe to the calls for more 
participatory democracy and a rebirth of civil society that are echoed in so many areas 
around the globe, we can see how Arendt's theory of the public sphere finds contemporary 
resonance. It will be shown in the rest of this article how Arendt's concept of citizen action 
and the active participation of ordinary people in politics can provide a theoretical basis for 
a theory of humane politics that focuses on influencing the macro-level of politics through 
voluntary, nonviolent action at the micro-level, that is, from the grass-roots level of acting 
citizens. 
2) Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, London: J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd., 1974, p. 7. 
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2. Plurality and Action 
The meaning of plurality 
A central feature of the human condition for Arendt is human plurality. By this she 
means simply that not one person but always two or more people live on this earth. The 
"human condition of plurality," she writes, refers "to the fact that men, not Man, live on 
the earth and inhabit the world."3) Plurality also means that humans, in their great diversity, 
are each unique and non-reproducible. Humans cannot be understood merely as instances 
of some more general law of behavior without doing violence to the true being of each 
person as distinct and unique. We are al in some sense a one-of-a-kind, non-replicable 
individual irreducible to anything else. "Plurality is the condition of human action," Arendt 
writes, "because we are al the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live."4) In part because we are each 
unique, Arendt didn't believe it possible to define human nature. Our individual uniqueness 
she once said takes on the quality of a non-natural idea that only a god could adequately 
define. Our uniqueness is such that it is not fully comprehended even by ourselves. 
Arendt saw how the moral dimension of the human person could be destroyed in the 
20th century by the physical and ideological terror of totalitarian regimes, and she was 
skeptical of much modem political theory, even theorists such as Locke and Rousseau, 
whose teachings about ideal states of human beings, lacked, in her judgment, grounding in 
actual political experience. In search of authentic politics, Arendt was drawn back to the 
classical political theory of Greece and (republican) Rome rather than to modem political 
theory, because it was in ancient times, she believed, that the vocabulary of truly authentic 
politics was first developed out of the rich everyday experience of ancient citizens. In her 
major theoretical work, The Human Condition, she makes it plain that she is concerned with 
theorizing about a politics of acting and doing that must be distinguished from a more 
ethereal enterprise like contemplation・or reflection on the nature of thought itself. Arendt 
focuses on the vita activa - i.e. the active life of labor, work, and action - not the vita 
contemplativa, which "has no correspondence with and cannot be transformed into any 
activity whatsoever."5) 
Humaneness as the attitude formed in talk and debate 
We become humanー andhumane一 accordingto Arendt by participating in the 
common enterprises and common concerns of other people. Crucial to this enterprise is 
ongoing conversation and debate. Through talk and debate "we humanize what is going on 
3) Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 7. 
4) Ibid., p. 8. 
5) Ibid., p. 20. 
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in the world and in ourselves," and it is in this manner that "we learn to be human."6) We 
develop our humanity and humaneness in ongoing talk and debate with our fellow human 
beings. The attitude we develop by this process, however, must be "sober and cool rather 
than sentimental,"7) if its true effect is to be realized. 
Arendt sometimes speaks of the common concerns and common enterprise of people 
that gets expressed through ongoing conversation and debate simply as "the world" (in 
contrast to a private, contemplative realm), and it is this world —the world of speech and 
human conversationー thatcontinues to be subject to controversy and upheaval. "The 
world lies between people," she writes, "and this in-between -much more than (as is often 
thought) men or even man - is today the object of the greatest concern and the most 
obvious upheaval in almost al the countries of the globe."8) She also uses the word "world" 
in a slightly different sense as a relationship "between [an] individual and his fellow men."9) 
These two concepts of "world" are closely connected with the central idea that the human 
world is formed out of common concern among people who have gathered together to 
participate in the ongoing conversation and debate. According to Arendt, life in modem 
societies is really without a world - without this in-between realm of discussion, 
deliberation, and debate - because of the disintegrating and alienating features of modem 
mass society. Modem society lacks the arena for citizens to come together to talk, deliberate, 
and act in concert, and this loss has been, in her view, inestimable in terms of the harms 
done to the health of modem political life. A more creative kind of political conversation, 
Arendt believes, was once developed in the Greek polis. 
Taking initiative as a beginner 
In Arendt's political thought political participation, as an ongoing activity, is more 
important than the attainment of any concrete goal of political life. It is important, she 
believed, to maintain citizen action through political participation beyond the achievement 
of any concrete end. A citizen movement that was too narrowly focused on a single end is 
to be dissolved once that end is achieved. This problem is avoided if a more universal and 
open-ended goal is chosen - like environmental protection, world peace, or the protection 
of human rights - but with such a goal the movement must be pursued beyond each 
generation. The problem then arises of intergenerational continuity and the need for 
renewed initiative. 
The key to the problem of intergenerational continuity and renewed initiative is solved 
for Arendt by the simple fact of new human beings coming into the world each with their 
unique individuality, creativity, and capacity for deliberative action that is theirs by 
birthright. "Each man is unique," she writes, "so that with each birth something uniquely 
6) Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times, New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, 1968, p. 25. 
7) Ibid., p. 25. 
8) Ibid., p. 4. 
9) Ibid., p. 5. 
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new comes into the world."10) Human action she goes on to explain, "has the closest 
connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can 
make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity ofbeginning 
something anew, that is, of acting."11) 
This''capacity of beginning something anew" is the power of taking initiative. It exists 
in al human beings potentially, and, as a result, al human beings have the power of 
achieving something unpredictable. It is possible for al human beings to begin something 
new, though special courage is often called for in the case of political action - such activity 
often requires that people care for the state of the world and the welfare of mankind more 
than for・their o畑 lifeand their personal security. But al human beings are capable of 
beginning something that is new by the fact of their natality, and on a non-political level, 
everyone can become a hero or a heroine in their o畑 personallife. 
Participating in citizenship activity is a form of "second birth"12), according to Arendt. 
Everyone joins fellow citizens as a newcomer in the beginning. "With word and deed we 
insert ourselves into the human world," Arendt writes, "and this insertion is like a second 
birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical 
appearance." "This insertion," she goes on, "is not forced upon us by necessity, like labor, 
it is not promoted by utility, like work. [B叫 itmay be stimulated by the presence of others 
whose company we may wish to join."13) To act in this sense means "to take an initiative," 
"to begin," "to achieve" (in Greek, arc he in, prattein) - that is, to begin an enterprise and 
to achieve it. To achieve this purpose, according to Arendt, we must have a sense of per-
sonal responsibility, a sense of obligation to our fellow citizens and to the world to achieve 
a noble purpose and to finish what we have begun. 
The collective action and activities of citizens in Arendt's view constitute an "in-
between" or mediated world that is a crucial web of human relationships. "The realm of 
human affairs," she writes, "consists of the web of human relationships which exists 
wherever men live together."14) This mediated web of human relationships is the world of 
common purpose and common activity, and paradoxical as it may seem, it is the world in 
which each individual experiences his owr1 uniqueness and individuality. The peer group 
constituted by the ongoing actions of engaged citizens, according to Arendt, constitutes the 
"the space of appearance" by which she means the space where everybody can be 
recognized and admired for their own deeds and speeches in their own individuality. This 
is the space where one confirms who one is, as an individual and unique being. 
10) The Human Condition, p. 178. 
11) Ibid, p. 9. 
12) Ibid., p. 176. 
13) Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
14) Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
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A ・ction and cdIZen activity 
For Arendt it is a fundamental condition of human existence to appear before others 
in order to establish one's own identity and at the same time confirm the reality of the 
surrounding world. It is indispensable, she believes, to live in a world of other people to 
achieve one's humanness in ful. As she writes, "without a space of appearance and without 
trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one's self, 
of one's own identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world can be established beyond 
doubt."15) For Arendt, as for the ancient Greeks —or more specifically the Periclean 
Athenians — this kind of self-realization in the company of others was most importantly 
carried forth in the practice of citizen action and participatory democratic politics. 
The model of the Greek polis, however, would obviously be problematic today in the 
wake of the much larger scale of governments and polities that exist on the nation-state 
level. We do not live today in such a small political community as the ancient Greek polis. 
As the size of a political community becomes ever larger it becomes more difficult for 
ordinary citizens to daily and directly participate in politics. The question that arises here 
is whether it is possible under modem circumstances to have what might be called a 
genuine civic life. A grass-roots type of citizen action, however, is stil possible in the 
modem world, and can be seen in many of the reform-oriented movements of the 
contemporary world, such as the environmental and peace movements. 
People who participate in citizen action are usually concerned with some kind of 
public matter, and such action can change the world. The possibilities of citizenship activity 
in the modem world are much greater than many people realize, and the effect of such 
activity can be truly transformative. Citizens acting in public at their free will have an 
enormous capacity to work and cooperate with others, to build open network-type 
organizations that include many individuals otherwise unknown. By working together with 
other citizens previously unknown to us, we are able to creatively solve various problems 
in the contemporary society that can elude solution by the top-down bureaucratic structures 
of the modem nation-state. 
According to Arendt's theory of political action, in order to realize our true humanity 
and humaneness it is necessary for us to be concerned with public matters not construed 
from any self-interest but from the interest of a larger world of cooperating human beings. 
"In the center of politics," she writes, "is always the care for the world."16) The radicalism 
of Arendt's thought is thus seen in its focus on cooperation-directed citizen action that is 
humanistic and humane. Unlike Kant's humanism, however, Arendt is less concerned about 
the motive of one's action, since the motive may be mixed. What counts in her eyes is the 
willingness of people to bear responsibility for the world. 
15) Ibid., p. 208. 
16) Hannah Arendt, Was ist Politik? : Fragmente aus dem Nachlass, herausgegeben von Ursula Ludz; Vorwort 
von Kurt Sontheimer, Munchen: Piper, 1993, p. 24. 
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In Arendt's view, the ends pursued by citizen action, while important, are stil not as 
important as the process of public deliberation and action. Arendt specifically rejects an 
instrumental or teleological view of politics in which only the ends or goals matter. Such 
a view, she believes, can al too easily lead to the justification of terror and violence to 
realize one's political ends, as has sadly been the case throughout much of modem politics. 
Deliberating, debating, and acting in concert with others are al centrally important to the 
political process according to Arendt. Process is more important than the ends agreed upon. 
But it would be a mistake to conclude that Arendt's view is that of a "politique pour la 
politique," as Martin Jay has suggested.17) Ends count for a whole lot for Arendt, but the 
means of achieving ends and the process of deliberation whereby ends are decided upon 
are also important - indeed, more important. Citizens should engage in politics, she 
believed, not simply as a means for affirming a specific purpose, but to affirm life itself, 
and to carry out our individual responsibility and obligation for the world. 
3. The Citizen as an Equal 
Equality as an artificial attribute 
Arendt's political theory is rightfully seen as having opened up a new dimension in 
our understanding of freedom.18) Her idea of freedom draws heavily upon the experience 
of the free citizens of the democratic polis of ancient Athens, and as such, is far distanced 
from the idea of freedom found in modem liberalism as exemplified, for instance, by 
thinkers like John Stuart Mill. As Margaret Canovan explains, "against this almost 
universally accepted [ modern] view that freedom is a feature of private life, Hannah Arendt 
sets the totally opposed notion that it is located in public life and is a feature of action 
carried on in the company of one's fellows."19) Her view of freedom is in many ways anti-
modernist and not only conflicts with Mill's understanding of freedom as a private-realm 
concept, but is equally incompatible with the emphasis of Kant and others on freedom as 
a problem of the inner world of an individual. For Arendt, freedom is exercised in the 
political realm by free citizens deliberating and debating over common projects that are 
seen to further the interest of the world. 
Closely tied to her concept of political freedom - a freedom which entails the notion 
of acting in concert with others - is her idea of political equality. Arendt's concept of 
equality is also derived largely from the Greek polis experience, which she believes has a 
kind of universal validity for different cultures and times. Unlike Tocqueville, who thought 
equality was a danger to freedom, Arendt points out that political equality was "originally 
17) Martin Jay, "Opposing Views," Partisan Review, vol. 65, no.3 (1978), p. 367. 
18) For example, Margaret Canovan considers HannahArendt's understanding of freedom as her most important 
contribution to political theory (See The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, p. 72). 
19) Ibid., p. 73. 
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almost identical with [freedom]"20) - and, in her view, it stil remains so even today. 
Equality for Arendt means the equal rights and obligations of equal citizens in an ongoing 
deliberative process such as that which existed in the ancient Athenian polis. But equality 
in this sense, Arendt is quick to emphasize, is not something natural; human beings are not 
equal by nature. Some are bigger, some smaller; some very intelligent, others not so 
intelligent; some are born to riches, others are poor; some have strong leadership qualities, 
others could simply listen and follow. 
Not by nature, but by artificial convention was equality achieved in the Greek polis, 
Arendt explains. Human beings, she writes, "received their equality by virtue of citizenship, 
not by virtue of birth."21) Humans, in other words, become equal through the laws. 
Freedom and equality are thus "conventional and artificial, the products of human effort 
and qualities of the man-made world."22) "The equality attending the public realm," Arendt 
writes, "is necessarily an equality of unequals who stand in need of being'equalized'in 
certain respects and for specific purposes."23) Equality is thus not an attribute of nature but 
an attribute of the in-between world of social interaction and political deliberation. But 
according to Arendt, equality is the precondition of real freedom, for if one is not equal in 
the political realm one cannot be fre. 
Equality in the public realm 
The idea that equality is a feature of the public realm is exemplified in Arendt's view 
by the contrast between the Greek household and the Greek polis. In the Greek household 
—the private realm - inequality prevailed with the male head of household ruling over 
his wife, children, and slaves as a dictator or even tyrant. The private household realm was 
governed by a principle of command and obedience.・But in the public realm Greek male 
citizens engaged with others as equals seeking neither command nor obedience. Regardless 
of their social position, family background, age, or other personal features, citizens were 
al equal. The Athenian citizen was neither king nor subject. As Arendt explains, "To be 
free meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or to command and not to be in 
command oneself. It meant neither to rule nor to be ruled."24) 
Today, of course, we cannot make the same distinctions that were made in ancient 
times. There was a double standard in the ancient world that we cannot accept in regard 
to men and women, free and slave. The concept of political equality that Arendt sees 
exemplified in the public realm of Greek male citizens is stil of value today and merely 
needs to be expanded so as to include the formerly excluded — the women, the non-
citizens, the slaves, etc. Besides the idea of equality itself, what is more valuable in the 
20) Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, New York: The Viking Press, 1963, p. 23. 
21) Ibid., p. 23 
22) Ibid., p. 23. 
23) The Human Condition, p. 215. 
24) Ibid., p. 32(emphasis in original). 
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ancient Athenian understanding of politics as Arendt interprets it is the cardinal importance 
placed on citizen action, deliberation and debate, ・and the substitution of persuasion for 
coercion and violence. What modems can learn from the ancient Greeks is the importance 
of deliberative political action, taken by free and equal citizens, who could speak freely and 
in their own unique voice and seek to persuade rather than command. Freedom, equality, 
and nonviolent persuasion are features of Athenian citizenship that have enduring relevance 
for us today. 
Five tenets of citizenship and citizen action 
The political theory of Hannah Arendt continues to inspire us to address the need to 
establish norms of citizen action in the modem world. The idea of citizen action and 
"citizenship education" has attracted the attention of many people in countries like Britain 
and the United States in recent years where some school curricula have been newly 
introduced dealing with these subjects. Citizenship, it is sometimes said, has four main 
attributes: rights, responsibilities, participation, and identity.25) Arendt was particularly 
concerned with the third attribute of citizenship listed here - participation - and her 
political theory stresses the need for citizen participation and citizen associations as 
prerequisites for any kind of authentic public policy making. If we define a citizen as "an 
individual open to others and society,"26) we can say that citizen participation and citizenship 
action are necessary to the health of any decent polity. Even beyond the Greek polis, citizen 
associations, it will be contended here, are needed just as much in the modem world as 
they were in the time of the ancients. Continuing in this Arendtian mold, I would like to 
suggest five key attributes of citizen participation and citizen action, each of which is 
crucial to the formation of vibrant participatory governance. 
〔l〕Spontaneity and creativity are crucial. When citizens are al free and eq叫 andwilling 
to engage in discussion and debate with others, creative and spontaneous responses can 
emerge from the process of political deliberation. While some participants in the deliberative 
process will assume a leadership role and take the initiative in proposing new ideas, and to 
this extent there is an element of inequality in such deliberations, al have the right and the 
capacity to participate in the decision-making process. And those who take the initiative on 
one occasion may not be the same as those who assume the initiative on another day when 
dealing with another topic. Citizen participation fosters creative and spontaneous responses 
to ongoing political problems. 
〔2〕To take initiative in political deliberation is closely related to the concept of citizen 
responsibility. Responsibility is closely tied to the belief that one's words and actions are 
important, and that one has an obligation to carry through and finish what one has begun. 
25) See Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000, pp. 
126-132. 
26) SANO Shoji, Vorantia wo Hajimeru Maeni: Shiminkoekikatsudo (Before Beginning Volunteer Activity: 
Citizen Public-interest Activity), Tokyo: Kojinnotomo-sha, 1994, p. 37. 
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Citizenship responsibility in Arendt's view also requires that citizens care for the well-being 
of others and the world and make this care the focus of their citizen activity. 
〔3〕Citizenship participation requires participation as equals. Citizens do not place each 
other under command-obedience type of relationships. Although everyone is not equal in 
physical strength or intellectual capacity, everyone is unique in their own way and al must 
respect the value and uniqueness of others. Everyone must have a say in the deliberative 
process, and in order to act cooperatively, it is necessary to have equal relationships among 
them. For citizenship deliberation to be carried out effectively, it is necessary for it to be 
anchored in the consciousness of political equality. Everyone must be allowed to participate 
in the discussion and debate. No one's voice may be privileged over any one else's. 
〔4〕Individuals who participate in politics of deliberation or of discourse must foster a spirit 
of open-mindedness. Open-mindedness fundamentally means to be open to the criticism of 
others. Only by being open to such criticism can we hope to eliminate the narrowness and 
prejudice that is inherent in the human being. Through ongoing deliberation and debate, 
and through consideration of the critical viewpoints of others, we can help liberate ourselves 
from the self-interest and one-sidedness that is usually reflected in our own views or in the 
views embodied in our inherited customs and folkways. None of us is entitled to have a 
monopoly on truth. No one culture or tradition embodies al there is to know or al that is 
of value. In the present age of globalization, it is particularly important to foster the ability 
to understand one another beyond the borders of our own nation and culture. 
〔5〕A sense of justice is also a key component of good citizenship. Here, "sense of justice" 
simply means the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. We develop our ability to 
distinguish right from wrong —to determine, that is, what is just and what is unjust -not 
merely through deliberation with others, but even more importantly, by cultivating our inner 
capacity of moral discernment and just dealings. To do this it is important to cultivate an 
independent thinking space in ourselves specifically for this purpose. Cultivating a sense of 
justice thus requires some degree of reflective or contemplative thinking activity, though it 
is directed toward the outer world of action and deeds rather than the inner world of the 
religious contemplative self-seeking. 
These five tenets of citizen participation and citizen action can be realized even in the 
modem world in various civic associations dedicated to solving some of the key problems 
confronted by modem societies. These include such issues as the environment, human 
rights, the problems of political refugees, homelessness, and poverty. The spontaneity and 
creativity of voluntary citizens'organizations can provide solutions to such problems that 
have proven so intractable to the efforts of large, bureaucratic state institutions usually 
devoid of citizen participation and citizen control. We need to think over what kind of 
democracy we want to live in, and whether our current form of governance really lives up 
to the ideal of self-government that most of free and cooperative human beings deserve. 
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4. The Road to Radical Democracy 
Arendt's criticism of modern democracy 
Since Arendt's model of citizen action and deliberative governance was the Greek 
polis, it is not surprising that she is critical of modern representative democracy. Having 
witnessed the transition from the Weimar form of representative democracy to the 
totalitarian regime of Hitler, she knew first-hand that representative democracy could not 
insure freedom, equality, or the triumph of political wisdom. 
Arendt was also critical of the two-party system in Britain and the United States 
largely because such a system denied direct participation by acting citizens and represented 
only political interests rather than freely voiced political opinions. At the present time it 
would be necessary to support calls for greater use of referenda and NPO activity as means 
of furthering citizen empowerment. The idea of a large-scale representative democracy 
detached from the participatory presence of thinking, acting, and deliberating citizens was 
alien to Arendt's political theory, the touchstone of which was discussion and debate among 
free and equal citizens rather than among political elites. 
The word "democracy," Arendt points out, was originally a pejorative term for 
isonomy (no-rule in Arendt's translation). "The word'democracy,"'Arendt writes, "was 
originally coined by those who were opposed to isonomy and who meant to say: What you 
say is'no-rule'is in fact only another kind of rulership; it is the worst form of government, 
rule by the demos."27) Arendt was very aware, that the demos could become an impassioned 
mob and be swayed by powerful orators and demagogues - Hitler being a prime example 
一 orotherwise manipulated into conformity by the power of the dominant public opinion. 
Democracy, she says, can become unstable, because of "the fickleness of its citizens, their 
lack of public spirit, their inclination to be swayed by public opinion and mass 
sentiments. "28) 
What Arendt really supported was what M. Canovan calls "new republicanism" or 
"radical republicanism," which she understood as a political system in which a citizen 
becomes "a participator in the res publica, sharing in common responsibility for public 
affairs."29) This type of republicanism would have some features in common with the 
republicanism of Rousseau and Machiavelli, but it was distinguished from these by Arendt's 
belief that participation in public affairs must be voluntary. Arendt was also critical of 
Machiavelli's resort to violence to found new republics and was skeptical of certain types 
of patriotic appeals, as one might expect from someone who had seen the great crimes 
committed in the name of patriotism in both the First and Second World Wars. 
27) On Revolution, p. 23. 
28) Ibid, p. 227. 
29) Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 224. 
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The kind of republicanism Arendt advocated was a far cry from modem mass 
democracy where citizens lose their capacity to think freely in the face of mass conformity 
to the dominant public opinion. Her criticism of democracy in this regard was similar to 
that of Tocqueville. She agrees also with the following text in The Federalist: "When men 
exert their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fal 
into different opinions on some of them."30) This is not a bad thing for Arendt, but a sign 
of republican vigor and independence of spirit by unique individuals. The mass conformity 
engendered by modem mass democracy is incompatible with any genuine concern for the 
welfare of the society, or any genuine citizen initiative, she believed. Mass democracy 
stifles reason, initiative, and public spiritedness, according to Arendt, which is why she 
stressed the need for republican rather than democratic government. The two have been 
confused, however, since the nin.eteenth century. 
The idea of republican democracy 
Although she does not use the term, we can derive from Arendt's thought a theory of 
what might. be called "republican democracy."31) In the republican tradition from which 
Arendt draws, the people are empowered, so it is legitimate to speak of democracy 
("government by the people"), but the democracy she has in mind is always republican in 
the sense that citizens always talk, debate, and deliberate among each other with the public 
good (res publica) in mind. It is no accident that Arendt's On Revolution was popular with 
many Eastern Europeans who participated in the revolutions of 1989, and it became a 
source of inspiration to many seeking to move beyond totalitarian governments. 
At the heart of Arendt's "republican democracy" is the emphasis on public spiritedness 
and universal (as opposed to selfish or self-seeking) ideals such as human rights and world 
peace. Public spiritedness, in her view, leads neither to patriotism nor state-worship but to 
concern for what is best in the res publica. Political participation in the public sphere by 
civic-minded citizens is at the heart of Arendt's idea of politics with the citizens acting not 
only to further their collective well-being, but for the sheer "pleasure to be able to speak, 
to act, to breathe"(Tocqueville).32) Political activity itself has value for Arendt when 
engaged in by free and equal citizens and is seen as a vital part of a meaningful and 
fulfilling human life. 
While it is of great value for citizens to engage in politics, at the same time such 
30) On Revolution, p. 227 (cited from The Federalist, no. 50). 
31) See Antonia Grunenberg, "Einleitung," in Totalitare Herrschaft und republikanische Demokratie : fiinfzig 
Jahre The Origins of Totalitarianism von Hannah Arendt, hrsg. von Antonia Grunenberg unter Mitarbeit von 
Stefan Ahrens und Bettina Koch, Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2003, p. 9. As Iseult Honohan suggests, "the 
failure of liberal democracy to prevent the rise of totalitarian governments gave a new impetus [ torepublicanism] 
in the aftermath of the Second World War." (Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism, London: Routledge, 2002, 
p. 119). 
32) On Revolution, p. 121. 
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participation, Arendt believes, must be voluntary. There must be no obligation to participate 
in politics; its participants must be "self-chosen." She sees the freedom not to participate 
in politics as one of the valuable contributions of our Christian heritage. The "freedom from 
politics," she writes, "was unknown to Rome and Athens," and was "politically perhaps the 
most relevant part of our Christian heritage."33) This kind of aristocratic voluntarism 
characterizes Arendt's republicanism, and is seen as necessary to preserve the spontaneity 
and freedom necessary for genuine deliberation and debate. No one should be coerced into 
becoming a participating citizen. 
In "The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost Treasure," the last chapter of On Revolu-
tion, Arendt extols the council system as "a new form of government that would permit 
every member of the modem egalitarian society to become a'participator'in public 
affairs."34) While those who joined the council might be spoken of as elites, they were "the 
only political elite [that was] of the people and sprang from the people [that] the modem 
world has ever seen."35) Those who did not participate were self-excluded, so there could 
not arise the feeling of alienation and powerlessness that pervades non-republican forms of 
government. In the council system the people selected were chosen "for their trustworthiness, 
their personal integrity, their capacity of judgment, [ and] often for their physical courage."36) 
In this way the council system reconciled equality and authority. 
Arendt goes well beyond the ancient Greek ideal of equality in that her theory does 
not countenance discrimination on the basis of race, sex, social status, or class. The category 
of who may be a citizen must be expanded to include effectively al adults under the 
jurisdictions of the laws. In the public political realm - the "space of appearance"ー al
people confront each other as equals. While people may be very unequal outside the public 
space of the republican order, within this space al enjoy equal rights for "freedom in a 
positive sense is possible only among equals."37) 
A final aspect of Arendt's "republican democracy" is the emphasis on cooperation and 
acting in concert. Liberal democracy can be criticized because of its competitive and 
adversarial nature where each side seeks to achieve victory and avoid defeat. Republican 
democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes the element of cooperation. Such cooperation is 
necessary to achieve genuine social harmony and public virtue. Today, such cooperation is 
particularly urgent in the face of the troubling inroads of competitive market values into 
the civic and political realm, and the need for transnational cooperation in an age of 
globalization and increasingly porous borders. In the modem world, it is necessary to 
cooperate across borders, and such cooperation carries the possibility of a greater recognition 
of our universal humanity and the opportunity to develop creative solutions to problems 
33) Ibid., p. 284. 
34) Ibid., p. 268. 
35) Ibid., p. 282. 
36) Ibid., p. 278. 
37) Ibid., p. 279. 
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such as environmental degradation which aflict al of us around the world. 
Towards nonviolent democracy 
For Arendt the political realm was identified as the realm in which persuasion and 
other nonviolent activities gain currency in contrast to the many non-political realms where 
force and violence reign supreme. Both・the household, in which slaves and women were 
ordered about, and the sphere of international relations, where bloody conflicts took place, 
were seen by Arendt as arenas in the lives of the ancient Greeks that were not political. "To 
be political," she writes, "to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through 
words and persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to 
force people by violence, to command rather than persuade, were pre-political ways to deal 
with people, characteristic of life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the 
household head ruled with uncontested, despotic powers."38) Today we would wish to 
expand this Greek concept of the political to include much of both the private realm and 
the realm of foreign relations insofar at least as the principle of nonviolent persuasion can 
be made to operate in each. Nonviolent discourse and non-coercive persuasion must be 
made to substitute for brute force. 
Arendt recognized that violence is often inevitable when a new state or new regime is 
formed. This process is perhaps most justified in the case of a revolution whose purpose is 
the liberation of a people from oppression by a tyrannical power. In such a revolution, she 
says, violence is often used to bring about "a new beginning, …to constitute an altogether 
different form of government, to bring about the new body politic."39) But Arendt was 
hesitant to affirm the use of violence in politics even in a revolutionary setting lest it lead, 
as it al too easily can and does lead, to the idea that good ends can justify the use of violent 
means. She believed in fact that the whole concept of politics as a means-end kind of 
craftsmanship or fabrication, as an arena, that is, in which rational plans or utopias are 
carried out in the manner in which a craftsman crafts an artifact, is one fraught with danger 
and confusion. Such thinking, she believed, easily leads to the pragmatic kind of argument 
that "you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs,"40) and this type of thinking, she 
believed, has led in the modem world to the justification of murder on a grand scale. "We 
are perhaps the first generation," she writes, "which has become fully aware of the 
murderous consequences inherent in a line of thought that forces one to admit that al 
means, provided that they are efficient, are permissible and justified to pursue something 
defined as an end. "41) 
Arendt sees Plato's utopian vision of the model city in The Republic as a model for 
al political theory which seeks to eliminate political action and replace it with instrumental 
38) The Human Condition, pp. 26-27. 
39) On Revolution, p. 28. 
40) The Human Condition, p. 229. 
41) Ibid., p. 229. 
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rationality. The philosopher-king in The Republic makes his polis in the way a sculpture 
makes his statue. Such a process, however, eliminates citizen action, and as the modem age 
has shown, Arendt argues, this kind of instrumental rationality easily leads to the justification 
of mass violence and murder. Her criticism of utopian blueprints and instrumental rationality 
in politics is summed up in the following statement: "Only the modem age's conviction 
that man can know only what he makes…brought forth the much older implications of 
violence inherent in al interpretations of the realm of human affairs as a sphere of 
making."42) This has been particularly striking in the series of revolutions, characteristic of 
the modem age, al of which - with the exception of the American Revolutionー show
the same combination of the old Roman enthusiasm for the foundation of a new body politic 
with the glorification of violence as the only means for'making'it. Marx's dictum that 
'violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one,'that is, of al change 
in history and politics, only sums up the conviction of the whole modem age and draws 
the consequences of its innermost belief that history is'made'by men as nature is'made' 
by God."43) 
Thus Arendt believed that the substitution of making for acting, of instrumental 
rationality for genuine citizen action, made politics degenerate into a means to obtain a 
supposedly "higher" end.44) As a thinker who survived the era of totalitarianism, Arendt 
here was sensitive to the problem of justifying immoral means in politics —she knew that 
such thinking can al too easily lead to slave labor camps or Auschwitz. When "making" 
— that is, instrumental rationalityー issubstituted for genuine political action (citizen 
action), these kinds of horrors are the typical result. 
The separation of power from violence 
An important distinction that Arendt makes in her writing is that between violence and 
power. This distinction is made most sharply in her essay "On Violence." Arendt is 
particularly critical of the maxim of Mao Tse-Tung whereby it is said that "power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun."45) What can grow out of the barrel of a gun, Arendt contends, 
is not power but violence, coercion, and force. A man with a gun can indeed force others 
to comply with his wishes, she argues, but this is not power by definition. Power in her use 
of the term refers to the potential effects produced by people "acting in concert" to persuade 
and convince others.46) Power thus depends upon the number of people who support a 
policy or a government and their level of conviction and persuasion, not on instruments of 
violence and coercion like firearms or weapons of war. Violence can be exercised by a 
42) Ibid, p. 228. 
43) See ibid., p. 228. 
44) See ibid., p. 229. 
45) See Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," in Crises of the Republic, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972, 
p. 113. 
46) See ibid, p. 143. 
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single person - in the extreme by a megalomaniacal dictator commanding vast armies of 
destruction - but power according to Arendt only comes through numbers and conviction 
- in the extreme case by a whole people al united against a single tyrant. She writes on 
this: "Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in 
existence only so long as the group keeps together."47)'ヽTheextreme form of power is All 
against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All."48) 
Free citizens working together, according to this view, produce power -people power 
or citizen power - and this power can transform the world, according to Arendt. This kind 
of people power grows from people connecting themselves "horizontally" in a network of 
communication rather than "vertically" in a hierarchy of subordination and command. This 
view has had a great influence in more recent times on theorists of nonviolent citizen action 
such as Gene Sharp or Michael Randle. Sharp regards power as "the power of a united 
people,"49) and asserts that this kind of power has the ability to overthrow even dictators. 
Randle, whose views have been heavily influenced by Arendt's ideas, stresses the importance 
of voluntary cooperation as the key to effective collective action. so) Power, in the Arendtian 
sense, was clearly on display as a "people power" in the Philippine Revolution of 1986, 
and the East European Revolutions in 1989, and these events have proven that nonviolent 
revolution, far from being an impractical project envisioned only by dreamers unfamiliar 
with the real world of power politics, can be both real and effective. 
One of the examples that Arendt gives of successful nonviolent citizen action is the 
Gandhian independence movement in India in the 1930s and 1940s. She admits, however, 
that nonviolent citizen action is not always effective against the brutal violence of repressive 
regimes. The nonviolent protest of the Czechoslovak people against Russian tanks, she says, 
was "a textbook case of a confrontation between violence and power in their pure states"51) 
- and it was a case where initialy, at least, the tanks won. There is some truth to the claim, 
Arendt says, that "out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting 
in the most instant and perfect obedience,"52) as organized violence can sometimes defeat 
nonviolent citizen action and citizen power. The Gandhian movement, she says, would 
probably not have been effective if the nonviolent resistance had been against Hitler's 
Germany rather than the more receptive British parliamentary regime. But the substitution 
of violence for citizen power achieves victory for a regime at a very high moral, spiritual, 
and existential cost, Arendt says, and her ideal of republican democracy looks forward to 
the creation of a political situation where violence is minimized and people power gains 
maximum strength. Arendt, however, did not believe that armies and police forces could be 
47) Ibid., p. 143. 
48) Ibid., p. 141. 
49) Gene Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1970, p. 21. 
50) See Michael Randle, C面lResistance, London: Fontana Press, 1994, p. 2. 
51) "On Violence," pp. 152. 
52) Ibid., p. 152. 
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made to go away any time soon, and while it is possible to create a situation where violence 
becomes less likely to occur, violence, she believed, would always lurk at the extreme of 
politics. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has tried to recapture Arendt's ideal of republican democracy in order to 
cherish and develop it. Her ideas concerning republicanism and citizen power are rich in 
insight and practical implications which are of enormous value to the modem, post-
totalitarian world of globalized economies and liberal democracies. While no one would 
dispute the superiority of the kind of representative democracies that have become dominant 
in the more economically developed parts of the globe since the collapse of fascism and 
communism, at the same time, the increasing concentration of power in the hands of 
professional politicians, the manipulation of mass opinion by powerful news media, the 
increasing influence of money and self-serving interest groups in modem politics, the 
growth of mammoth, unresponsive government bureaucracies, and the decline in civic 
spiritedness among the general population are developments that tear the heart and soul out 
of democracy and rob it of much of its creative potential. Arendt's focus on citizen action 
and people power, and her appreciation for the greatness of the participatory republicanism 
of ancient Athens, is a much needed corrective to the tendency of modem liberal democrats 
to celebrate uncritically the, superiority of their regimes over totalitarianism. The kind of 
republican democracy that Arendt envisioned can serve as a powerful corrective to the 
many ils beset by modem liberal democracies. 
In her understanding of politics, not in terms of violence or force but in terms of the 
public power of citizens who come together on a daily basis to deliberate and exchange 
ideas, Arendt has found a key antidote to the malaise that aflicts much of modem 
democracy. The kind of citizen-oriented republicanism that she envisioned is able to spur 
to the creative potential of many individuals who spontaneously deliberate and work 
together to focus on the needs of the day. In the republicanism of Periclean Athens, the 
republican system envisioned by Thomas Jefferson, and the council system Arendt finds 
models for a radical kind of participatory politics that has continuing relevance for the 
modem age. 
Above al, Arendt's ideas provide the basis for a renewed sense of citizen empowerment 
and the reconstitution of modem politics from the bottom up. It is only when citizens and 
citizen action take the initiative and become the driving force in politics that the ideal of 
authentic democracy -in the sense of "power to the people"ー canbe effectively realized. 
The realization of such a politics, where the center of gravity lies in citizen-initiative rather 
than the power and manipulation of elites, has important advantages. It provides not only 
greater creativity and humaneness in the formulation of public policy, but also enables 
ordinary citizens to reap the fruit of political participation, which are not available in the 
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private sphere. Citizen participation in politics encourages individual initiative, open-
mindedness, creative problem-solving, and a sharing of ideas that can be of benefit to al 
concerned. 
Although citizen action in Arendt's own thought was limited to territorially-restricted 
sovereignties —the idea of a sovereign world-state, she once said, "would be the end of 
al citizenship. It would not be the climax of world politics, but quite literally its end"53) 
- we can easily expand upon her idea of citizen participation in the contemporary world 
to include citizen initiatives beyond nation-state borders. Many of our problems today are 
transnational in scope - including environmental degradation and climate change, 
international war, poverty, AIDS, etc. —and they may be most effectively addressed by 
the cooperative relationships of citizens working both within and between nations. The 
development of modem transportation and communication provides possibilities for such 
intra-and transnational citizen initiatives that were certainly not available to Greek citizens 
in classical times or to the yeoman farmers in Thomas Jefferson's day. Arendt's ideas are 
rich in implications and possibilities for development, and rather than confronting 
international politics and the global arena as mere spectators or observers, engaged citizens 
must take the initiative in addressing problems that cannot be left only to commercial 
interests, bureaucrats, and professional politicians. We have a responsibility to the world, 
to speak in Arendtian terms, and this responsibility today must be global in scope. 
53) Men in Dark Times, p. 82. 
